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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Aggravated Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302 (1978), and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1986) constitute the same 
offense for the purposes of double jeopardy, thus precluding 
acquittal of one and conviction of the other. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , : Case No. 860160 
- v - t 
RAULE AMADOR, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Raule Shel Amador, was charged with one 
count of Possess ion of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restr icted person, 
in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1986). 
Defendant was convicted of the charge in a bench t r i a l 
held February 1 1 , 1986, in the Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court, in 
and for Sa l t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, pres iding. Judge Wilkinson sentenced the defendant to 
a term in the Utah State prison of not l e s s than one nor more 
than f i f t e e n years . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on September 14, 1985, 
defendant and LuAnn McSharry, went to the residence of Wendy 
Bromfield and Danny Worthen (R. 212) . Only Ms. Bromfield and her 
three chi ldren were home (T. 212-214). Defendant t o l d Ms. 
Brorafield that Danny Worthen owed LuAnn McSharry money, and that 
they would wait for Danny1s arr iva l (T. 214) . 
At approximately 11:00 p.m. Mr. Worthen arrived, 
accompanied by John Nicholson (T. 214). Mr. Worthen, Ms. 
McSharry, and defendant argued about an incident which had 
occurred the previous night (T. 214-217) • Defendant became angry 
and told Mr. Worthen "not to talk to LuAnn like that" (T. 217). 
Defendant then pulled a gun out of the back of his pants, pointed 
it at Mr. Worthen (T. 217, 218, 272-274, 317-322), and demanded 
that Mr. Worthen pay LuAnn the money he owed her (T. 219). Danny 
tried to calm down the defendant (T. 219, 273), but the defendant 
kept the gun pointed at Danny (T. 220, 275, 276). 
LuAnn threatened to take Mr. Worthen1s television in 
lieu of payment of the debt (T. 221-22). Mr. Worthen threw 
LuAnn1s hands off the television (T. 222), whereupon defendant 
put the gun to Danny's throat (T. 221-223, 276) stating that the 
television would be taken unless he gave LuAnn money (T. 224, 
274). Mr. Worthen gave LuAnn twenty dollars (T. 224, 275). 
Defendant became startled when he heard sirens and he and LuAnn 
left the apartment (T. 225, 276). 
In the morning Mr. worthen and Ms. Bromfield reported 
the incident to the police (T. 225). Officer Robinson responded 
to the call, and testified that both Danny and Wendy reported 
that the defendant had pulled a gun and taken twenty dollars (T. 
143-146). Officer Robinson testified that both victims appeared 
scared when interviewed about the occurrence (T. 152). 
The information gathered by Officer Robinson was given 
to Detective LeVitre and Officer Anderson. Around midnight on 
September 15, 1985, the officers located defendant and LuAnn 
McSharry for questioning. The defendant was driving a vehicle in 
which Ms. McSharry was the passenger (T. 339, 340). A gun was 
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found in the vehicle under the front passenger seat near the 
transmission center section (T. 341). No fingerprints were found 
on the gun (T. 344), although Ms. McSharry later testified that 
the gun had been handled extensively (T. 126). 
Defendant was originally charged with one count of 
Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first degree, and Possession 
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony of the 
second degree. 
The trial court granted defense counsel's motion to 
sever Counts I and II of the Information (R. 20). The defendant 
was acquitted of Aggravated Robbery on January 20, 1986 before a 
jury (R. 75). On January 31, 1986, defendant waived his right to 
a jury trial on the remaining count; and on February 11, 1986, 
the defendant was tried before Judge Wilkinson on the charge of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person. The 
defendant was found guilty (R. 85) and sentenced to a term in the 
Utah State prison of not less than one nor more than fifteen 
years (R. 87). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The double jeopardy doctrine precludes a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. The crimes of 
aggravated robbery and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person are different offenses with different elements. 
Thus, an acquittal of aggravated robbery did not preclude a 
conviction of the possession charge. 
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ARgUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT1*? 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE POSSESSION CHARGE, 
SINCE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
BAR SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF A SEPARATE 
N ON-INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Specificallyr defendant 
claims that because the jury acquitted him of aggravated robberyf 
the jury necessarily found that defendant did not possess a 
dangerous weapon (App. Br. at 7). Thus, defendant argues Judge 
Wilkinson should have been estopped from convicting defendant of 
possessing a dangerous weapon (App. Br. at 8). 
Article I S 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
The guarantee against double jeopardy consists of three separate 
constitutional protections: "(1) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and (3) protection against multiple punishments for 
the same offense." (Emphasis added) State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 
(Utah 1983) citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
gee also State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 (1974). 
The double jeopardy doctrine precludes the State from 
making 
"repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing 
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s t a t e of anxiety and i n s e c u r i t y , as wel l 
as enhancing the p o s s i b i l i t y that even though 
innocent he may be found g u i l t y . " 
Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) c i t i n g Green v. 
Dnited S t a t e s , 355 U.S. 184 f 187-88 (1957) . 
Thus, the quest ion in the instant case becomes whether 
aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) , and 
possess ion of a dangerous weapon by a r e s t r i c t e d person, Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (1986) , c o n s t i t u t e the same offense . A 
brief review of the elements of each offense c l e a r l y ind ica te s 
that each offense has d i f f erent elements and that defendant was 
acquit ted of one offense and convicted of an e n t i r e l y d i f f erent 
of fense . 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) provides in part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery i f 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facs imi le of a 
firearm, knife or a facs imi l e of a knife 
or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes ser ious bodily injury upon another. 
Robbery i s defined as 
"the unlawful and intent ional taking of 
personal property in the possess ion of 
another from his person, or immediate 
presence, aga inst h i s w i l l , accomplished 
by means of force or fear.M 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (1986) prohibits a 
restricted person from possessing a dangerous weapon: 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a 
felony or is incarcerated at the Utah state 
prison or other like facility may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or 
control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this section 
5-
is guilty of a third degree felony, and if 
the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive 
or infernal machine, he is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
The fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of 
aggravated robbery does not necessarily mean that he was found 
not to be in possession of a firearm. It would be second-
guessing the thought process of the jury to assume such. 
The jury could have found that although defendant was 
armed with a firearm, he did not take personal property from Mr. 
Worthen against his will, or that he did not take property by 
means of force or fear. As a matter of fact, the defendant 
argued as part of his defense that there was no unlawful taking 
because Mr. Worthen admitted owing money to Ms. McSharry (T. 
186). The defendant further argued that the money was not given 
to him by the use of force or fear (T. 187). Defendant argued 
that assuming he was armed with a firearm, Mr. Worthen turned and 
walked away from defendant on three separate occasions, thus 
indicating that Mr. Worthen was not afraid of defendant (T. 187). 
Defendant even admits in his brief that "it is not known, nor can 
it be known, exactly how the jury deliberated and upon what 
precise reasoning he was acquitted" (App. Br. at 8). 
In order for defendant to have been found guilty of 
possession of a firearm, it was only necessary for Judge 
Wilkinson to find: 1) that defendant was on parole, and 2) that 
defendant had in his possession or under his custody or control a 
firearm. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (1986). 
The record clearly indicates defendant was on parole 
(T. 366). There is also substantial evidence in the record for 
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Judge Wilkinson to have found that defendant had in h i s 
possession or control a firearm (T. 217-27, 272-88, 317-23). 
On the other hand, before defendant could be found 
gui l ty of aggravated robbery, the jury must have found t h a t : 
1) defendant used a firearm, 2) defendant unlawfully and 
in ten t iona l ly took personal property, 3) from the possession of 
another or from his person or immediate presence, 4) against h i s 
w i l l , and 5) accompanied by means of force or fear , Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-301 and 302 (1978). In the ins tan t case the jury 
simply found tha t the s t a t e did not meet i t s burden in 
es tab l i sh ing a l l of the necessary elements of aggravated robbery. 
This Court ' s decision in S ta te v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 
(1979) i s d i spos i t ive of the issue in the in s t an t case. There, 
the defendant alleged tha t i t was double jeopardy to convict him 
of both carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle and possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a convicted person. This Court c i t ed to 
Blockburger v. United S t a t e s , 294 U.S. 299 as follows: 
The appl icable ru le i s t h a t , where the same 
act or t ransac t ion cons t i t u t e s a v io la t ion 
of two d i s t i n c t s ta tu tory provis ions, the 
t e s t to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offenses or only one i s 
whether each provision requires proof of 
an addi t ional fact which the other does 
not. " 
Sosa, 598 P. 2d a t 346, note 1 . The Sosa court went on to hold 
that "Iblecause the elements of appe l l an t ' s separate prosecutions 
d i f f e r , and e i the r offense could have been es tabl ished without 
es tab l i sh ing the other , the double jeopardy doctrine does not 
apply in the ins tan t case ." 
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Defendant c i t e s t o Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.S. 784 
(1969) as authority that defendant's cons t i tu t iona l r ight against 
double jeopardy was v i o l a t e d s ince defendant was t r i e d on an 
i s s u e already decided in a previous t r i a l . Defendant's re l iance 
on Benton i s misplaced. In Benton . the defendant was o r i g i n a l l y 
convicted of burglary and acquit ted of larceny in the same t r i a l . 
Because of a subsequent change in Maryland law, defendant was 
permitted to demand re-indictment and r e - t r i a l . At the second 
t r i a l , defendant was again charged with burglary and larceny. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the larceny charge and the t r i a l judge 
denied h i s motion. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court reversed the 
t r i a l court and ruled that because defendant decided to appeal 
h i s burglary conv ic t ion , he should not be forced to suffer re -
t r i a l on the larceny count as w e l l . 
" Ic londit ioning an appeal of one offense 
on a coerced surrender of a v a l i d plea 
of former jeopardy on another offense 
exac t s a f o r f e i t u r e in plain c o n f l i c t 
with the cons t i tu t iona l bar against 
double jeopardy." 
Id. at 796, c i t i n g Green v. United S t a t e s , 355 U.S. 184, 193-94 
(1957) . 
In the instant case defendant has never been tried, 
much less convicted or acquitted of the crime of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a convicted person, and thus, Benton is 
simply inapplicable. 
Finally, defendant appears to make an insufficiency of 
evidence argument. Defendant argues that because the jury 
acquitted defendant, the jury must have found defendant was not 
armed with a weapon and Judge Wilkinson was bound by this finding 
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in the subsequent trial. Thus, insufficient evidence existed to 
convict defendant of the possession charge. 
The standard articulated by this Court for reviewing a 
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is that the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom will be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict and to set aside a verdict 
the evidence must be "sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265, 1266 
(Utah 1984); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983). 
Moreover, it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
Judge Wilkinson was in no way bound by the verdict of 
acquittal of aggravated robbery since it is a different offense 
than possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. As 
stated earlier, the evidence presented in the instant case is 
more than sufficient to support the judgment: Defendant was on 
parole at the time of the incident (T. 366), and the evidence 
supported a finding that defendant was in possession of a firearm 
(T. 217-27, 272-88, 317-23). Because defendant was charged with 
two different offenses and sufficient evidence existed to convict 
defendant of the possession charge, the double jeopardy doctrine 
is simply inapplicable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the S ta te requests t h i s Court 
t o affirm defendant's conv ic t ion . 
DATED t h i s S day of February, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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